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THE POWER OF OCCLUSION 
Every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing. It is better to have a variety of models and archetypes so we 
stay flexible and open. 
Kenneth Burke  
There is no such thing as society 
Margaret Thatcher 
 
Category Mistakes 
To not be right is one thing, but to be told that what one says or believes is ‘not 
even wrong’1 is an even harder pill to swallow. It implies that rather than having 
slipped up in some more or less superficial way, perhaps deducing an argument 
from premises about which one should exercise more caution, one has instead 
failed to grasp something of fundamental substantive importance. One has 
ended up trafficking in nonsense despite oneself. But how is it decided what is 
to count as nonsense rather than what is to count as ‘merely’ wrong? 
On certain things it seems as if nature or, more generally, the world ‘as it 
is’ decides. For instance, in Douglas Adams’ The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the 
Galaxy, when the enormous supercomputer Deep Thought is asked for the 
“answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything", he 
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replies, after a period of 7.5 million years, “42”.2 Whatever answer might have 
been given – submission to God, joining an anarchist commune, committing 
oneself to procuring the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people – 
the naming of an integer is entirely meaningless. The very subject of the 
question prevents such a response from being intelligible –except as such a lack 
of intelligibility becomes intelligible as comedy. Gilbert Ryle gave form to this 
kind of mistake by labelling it a “category mistake”.3 Such mistakes are those 
made “by people who are perfectly competent to apply concepts, at least in the 
situations with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract 
thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not 
belong”.4  The examples Ryle gives to flesh out his argument have a similar 
flavour to the answer the Hitchhiker’s supercomputer gives. In other words, 
they are just, unquestionably, wrong.  
Ryle begins with a foreigner visiting Oxford who, after being shown a 
number of colleges, libraries and playing fields, etc., asks “but where is the 
University?” He is then told that the university is not another ‘collateral 
institution’; it is just a term used to describe the way in which all that he has 
already seen is organised. Another example is cricket. Another foreigner is 
invited/subjected to a game of cricket. He learns the functions of the various 
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4 Ibid. 7 
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players and officials: the bowlers, batsmen, the fielders, the umpires and the 
scorers. The foreigner then asks ‘who is responsible for team-spirit?’ Again, he 
has been caught looking for the wrong type of thing. Team-spirit is not some 
supplementary cricketing-operation but, roughly, the keenness with which each 
of the relevant cricketing-tasks is performed. It is a description of the 
enthusiasm with which various functions are carried out. 
These mistakes then are being made “by people who did not know how to 
wield the concepts University and …team-spirit.” Their puzzles arose from the 
inability to use certain items in the English vocabulary.5 But these problems are 
easily correctable. The university visitor and the tyro cricket spectator can be 
very quickly disabused of their mistaken views. Indeed, little more than the 
paragraph above would likely suffice. It is not as if people unfamiliar with 
universities or cricket can retort that their misunderstandings have been 
misunderstood, that they are merely approaching the subject from a different 
perspective which has its own value and truth content. Such an assertion would 
be to compound an innocent mistake with a bizarre kind of arrogance. The 
visitor, once told of his or her mistake the mistake is, barring pathological 
stubbornness, corrected. 
However, these kinds of category mistake provide only a sliver of the 
whole story. In order to move beyond that sliver, we leave Ryle’s own project, 
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which was to correct the profound category mistake he argues has grounded the 
philosophy of mind since Descartes, and instead turn toward Friedrich Hayek’s 
use of the notion of a category mistake. Hayek suggests that “to apply the term 
‘just’ to circumstances other than human actions or the rules governing them is 
a category mistake”.6 Uncontroversially, he goes on to suggest that “Nature can 
be neither just nor unjust” with the proviso that this holds good as long as nature 
is not somehow personalised and filled out with intentionality: hurricanes, if 
understood as a rapidly rotating storm system and not as God’s vengeance, can 
wreak havoc, but cannot be criticised for their injustice. A Martian visiting earth 
who, after witnessing a tree fall down and kill a man, declares the tree’s 
injustice, would have to be corrected in a way similar to Ryle’s visiting 
foreigners. He is applying a concept with no jurisdiction in this instance.  
So far, this application of the concept of justice to events in the natural 
world seems to have the same unquestionably wrong quality as Ryle’s 
examples. However, once Hayek describes the whole idea of ‘social justice’ as a 
category mistake, the alleged mistake is open to challenge.  
The grounding of Hayek’s rejection of the term ‘social justice’ rests on 
the following assumption:   
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There can be no test by which we can discover what is 'socially unjust' 
because there is no subject by which such an injustice can be committed 
and there are no rules of individual conduct the observance of which in 
the market order would secure to the individuals and groups the position 
which as such (as distinguished from the procedure by which it is 
determined) would appear just to us. It [social justice] does not belong to 
the category of error but to that of nonsense, like the term 'a moral 
stone’”.7 
Hayek has moved from saying that the term justice cannot be applied to 
acts of nature, to suggesting that a state of society cannot be described as just—
indeed as either just or unjust – because no-one has acted unjustly and there 
exist no rules of individual conduct which, by being observed, could bring about 
a distribution of rewards and positions we could consider just. What is doing the 
work in designating the concept ‘social justice’ a piece of nonsense on a par 
with the idea of a ‘moral stone’?  
Hayek claims that to attach the words ‘social’ or ‘distributive’ to ‘justice’ 
is ‘an abuse of the word’:8 that ‘in a society of free men whose members are 
allowed to use their own knowledge for their own purposes’ the term ‘social 
justice’ is ‘wholly devoid of meaning or content’.9 The problem and danger, 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 78. 
8 Ibid. 62. 
9 Ibid. 98. 
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from Hayek’s perspective, is that the expression is increasingly widely used and 
invoked as ‘a standard which ought to guide political action’ and it is hardly 
ever questioned whether ‘the expression has a definite meaning.’10 Indeed, the 
belief that ‘the expression has a definite meaning, describes a high ideal and 
points to grave defects in the existing social order which urgently call for 
correction’ receives ‘near-universal acceptance’ and, Hayek thought, ‘is at 
present probably the gravest threat to most other values of a free civilization’.11 
For Hayek, the key to understanding why so many make this category mistake 
is to see that it is a direct consequence of ‘the anthropomorphism or 
personification by which naïve thinking tries to account for all self-ordering 
processes’.12 Hence ‘the results of the spontaneous ordering of the market’ are 
‘interpreted as if some thinking being deliberately directed them, or as if the 
particular benefits or harm different persons derived from them were 
determined by deliberate acts of will, and could therefore be guided by moral 
rules’13 Instead of viewing society as ‘a spontaneous order of free men,’ it is 
seen as ‘an organization whose members are all made to serve a single 
hierarchy of ends. This would necessarily be a totalitarian system in which 
personal freedom would be absent.’14 
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13 Ibid. 62. 
14 Ibid. 75. 
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Hayek is clearly aware that the category mistake in question is not easily 
correctable. He knows that his contention that, ‘in a society of free men’, the 
very idea of ‘social justice’ involves a category mistake ‘cannot be proved’.15 
Unlike Ryle’s foreign visitors to Oxford and the cricket match, who can be 
quickly convinced where they went wrong and why, people—indeed, it would 
seem, nearly all people—are going to need much more than a friendly induction 
into local knowledge and linguistic usage. In other words, Hayek cannot do to 
social justice what Ryle did to the conceptual vocabulary of the Oxford visitor. 
Hayek faced a truly formidable challenge, recognizing that ‘the near-
universal acceptance of a belief does not prove that it is valid or even 
meaningful any more than general belief in witches or ghosts proved the 
validity of these concepts’.16 Hence the unmistakably embattled character of 
Hayek’s text. We are, he wrote, facing a ‘quasi-religious superstition,’ which 
‘we must fight when it becomes the pretext of coercing other men’; it 
constitutes ‘a threat’ against which we must protect ourselves by ‘subjecting 
even our dearest dreams to ruthless rational dissection.’17 These words display 
not only that what is at stake here is political on the grandest scale, embracing 
the defence of free-market capitalism, the challenge of socialism and the 
prospects for social democracy. They also reveal both the agonistic nature of 
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the challenge (‘we must fight’) and the understanding that the fight is in the 
realm of ideas and arguments (‘ruthless rational dissection’).  
That is why in 1947 Hayek joined with others to found the Mont Pelerin 
Society (MPS), involving Nobel prizewinning economists, philosophers, 
historians, business leaders and others, to combat ‘the state ascendancy and 
Marxist or Keynesian planning [that was] sweeping the globe’, with the goal of 
facilitating ‘an exchange of ideas between like-minded scholars in the hope of 
strengthening the principles and practice of a free society and to study the 
workings, virtues, and defects of market-oriented systems’. Hayek’s project, in 
short, was to engage in the battle of ideas with the key goal, among others, of 
rendering the very idea of social justice, and thus complaints of injustice, 
inapplicable to the understanding of market processes. Hayek was not alone in 
pursuing this project. He enjoyed considerable support from the academics in 
MPS, as well as from other agents and institutions. The aim of this project was 
the discrediting of widely prevailing views of and hopes for social justice. It 
has, over the last seventy years, met with no little success. It was, however, not 
the only strategy with this aim. Others retained but redefined the concept of 
social justice, delinking it from the anthropomorphism Hayek disdained, and 
instead interpreting the value of justice along individualistic, libertarian and 
market-favouring lines that proclaimed as illegitimate the pursuit of egalitarian, 
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indeed on some views all, patterned distributive outcomes (as, for instance, in 
Robert Nozick’s classic formulation of entitlement theories of justice.18   
Such projects, we will argue, are projects of occlusion: of rendering 
certain things invisible by casting doubt on the credibility of particular ways of 
describing phenomena. Such projects can be more or less successful:  complete 
success of such a project would consist in rendering certain descriptions 
altogether useless, the conceptual apparatus employed in such descriptions 
nonsensical, archaic and, most importantly, utterly mistaken.  
Such projects compete with other projects. The terms by which such 
competition gets performed are themselves up for grabs. Whether Hayek’s 
insights represent progress toward, for example, a better description of society 
depends on how those insights are assessed. In light of this competition over the 
terms of assessment, it becomes possible to ask whether Hayek was reporting 
(as he thought) on a scientific discovery by Austrian economics, a discovery 
that would (he hoped) render talk of social justice anachronistic and ultimately 
thinkable only by historians of economic thought – on a par with the way in 
which phlogiston would be viewed by later scientists. From within his project 
Hayek was attempting to pre-empt controversy by declaring the very term 
‘social justice’ a category mistake capable of delivering only nonsense. Hayek, 
of course, could ‘think’ the idea of social justice – the concept was available to 
                                                          
18 Robert Nozick. Anarchy, State and Utopia. (USA: Basic Books, 1974).  
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him. He could even make pronouncements condemning such widely-shared 
thoughts as wrong-headed and dangerous. The pre-emptive move constitutive of 
occlusion comes precisely here: between, on the one hand, the concepts that can 
be thought and, on the other, the ways in which those thoughts either get taken 
seriously as ways of describing the real world and what is thought possible 
within that world, or dismissed as fundamentally misguided about that reality. 
In other words, for Hayek and members of the MPS more generally, the thought 
that some distributional pattern could be imposed on complex societal systems 
was to be treated as a failure to understand the nature of those phenomena, i.e. 
the ‘self-ordering processes’ or ‘the spontaneous order of free men’ that 
constitute the market and market society.  
People can still ‘think’ about social justice in a way that Hayek would rail 
against. His (unrealized and unrealizable) hope was that the very language of 
‘social justice’ would become obsolete, so that social justice would be 
inconceivable because the very concept would no longer be available. But, short 
of that unachievable goal, the idea of social justice could nevertheless be made 
into a ‘mirage’ (Hayek’s word). In short, what could be ‘seen’ by use of the 
term ‘social justice’ could be dismissed as illusory, with the implication that 
social justice is neither feasible nor, even if attained, viable.  The common sense 
which grew out of the MPS’s strategies, and which came to influence the 
economic policies of both states and other non-state institutions, provided a 
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context within which ideas and policies that appealed to forms of government 
hoping to impose patterns of distribution could be treated as fundamentally 
mistaken, as dabbling in illusions. This lends such a project potentially 
enormous power in constructing not just the language by which certain 
phenomena are described, but what gets done about them. 
But adjudicating between a correct vision of the world and a mistaken 
one invites some obvious questions. What grounds the claim that one vision is 
correct and another or others mistaken? (the why question) Who makes the 
claim? (the who question) Who are the addressees of the claim? (the whom 
question) Whose interests does its general acceptance serve? (the cui bono 
question). By what means and in what ways is that acceptance secured? (the 
how question).19 
 
Anthropomorphism and animals 
Occlusion is at its most effective when what is occluded is ruled out, or 
excluded, from consideration, for what seems the purest common sense, where 
occlusion, as we might say, ‘stands to reason.’  For example, as already noted, it 
can seem obvious that nature itself cannot be criticised for its injustice. But does 
anthropomorphism—the attributing of human characteristics or behaviour to 
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gods or animals or objects--necessarily issue in category mistakes? That humans 
invariably anthropomorphize their gods is hardly surprising (What else could 
they do?). Is it, in principle, a violation of the scientific spirit and thus 
incompatible with practising (natural and social) science? Can it sometimes be a 
useful way of approaching and describing and explaining certain phenomena?    
It is intriguing that Hayek focuses on anthropomorphism as a category 
mistake that leads us to misunderstand social phenomena.  For consider 
anthropomorphism in relation to nonhuman animals: Is it self-evidently wrong 
to speak about chimps laughing when they get tickled (and engage with it in the 
complex way a child does, withdrawing before coming back for more), crows 
using tools or cuttlefish being able to perform facial recognition.?  It has always 
been a live question whether and to what extent (and with respect to which 
species of animals) it is a mistake to describe animal behaviour in terms of 
characteristics regarded as human. It is probably true to say that in most 
societies among ordinary people in everyday life there are different attitudes in 
respect of different species but anthropomorphising pet animals doubtless 
receives (as Hayek might say) near universal acceptance. On the other hand, 
many philosophers and scientists, including biologists and others studying 
animals, have viewed it as a mistake to be avoided at all costs.  
Frans de Waal praises David Hume for recognising a continuum between 
animal and human behaviours, and criticizes behaviourists and other scientists 
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who deploy two separate languages, such that, for example, ‘shared human and 
ape behaviour is explained differently.’20 For de Waal, by contrast, 
anthropomorphism is a good research strategy if your goal is to arrive at 
‘testable ideas and replicable observations.’21 Indeed, it is (as the epigraph from 
Kenneth Burke to this essay suggests) worth asking the question, which the idea 
of a category mistake closes off, whether it makes better explanatory sense to 
endow animals with human-type attributes. How we answer that question is to 
be decided according to our assumptions about what constitutes an adequate 
explanation of animal behaviour.  
 Why, then, is it claimed that anthropomorphizing animals is a mistake? 
Why do people engage in boundary work in this human-animal domain? De 
Waal calls this resistance to anthropomorphism ‘anthropodenial’ – ‘the a priori 
rejection of shared characteristics between humans and animals’, a ‘wilful 
blindness to the human-like characteristics of animals, or the animal-like 
characteristics of ourselves.’22 One apparently obvious explanation for this 
rejection is in terms of vested interests: We have a stake in retaining mastery 
over the animal world and in erecting a wall between the species. As the 
philosopher Christine Korsgaard suggests, it may be thought that we are ‘more 
likely to be comfortable in our treatment of our fellow creatures if we think that 
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21 Ibid. 63. 
22 Ibid. 65. 
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being eaten, worn, experimented on, held captive, made to work and killed, 
cannot mean anything like the same thing to them as it would to us’ and hence if 
they are ‘unlike us in their emotional and cognitive lives.’23 
That is, however, an explanation, in terms of motivation, not a 
justification, in terms of reasons. In offering such reasoned justification for the 
rejection of anthropomorphism, as distinct from the aforementioned 
motivational account, Korsgaard, a Kantian, essentially argues (without using 
the phrase) that to speak of moral (nonhuman) animals is to commit a category 
mistake. (But note that a ‘moral animal’ is more controversial in ways that a 
‘moral stone’ is not). They are, she writes, ‘beyond moral judgment.’24 She 
asserts that they act intentionally but not at the ‘deeper level of intentionality.’25 
Their purposes are given to them by their affective states—their emotions and 
their instinctual or learned desires. They are, she suggests ‘in Harry Frankfurt’s 
phrase, wanton: they act on the instinct or desire or emotion that comes 
uppermost.’26 They clearly exhibit intelligence: they pursue purposes, perform 
actions under the agent’s control, and some animals are aware of their purposes 
and think about how to pursue them. But she is ‘tempted by’ an ‘old-fashioned 
philosophical project, dating back to Aristotle’ that seeks to fix the ‘central 
difference’ between humans and other animals, locating it in the claim that 
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‘morality represents a break with our animal past.’27 Unlike Hume and his 
fellow sentimentalists, Kantians focus on the ‘deeper level of assessment’,28 
unique to humans, that renders choice possible: where the question before the 
agent is not which action will get what you want most, but whether your 
wanting it most is a good reason, that is justifies, taking that action. Hence the 
capacity to think whether what you are doing is right or wrong. Hence the 
capacity to choose our ends, for autonomy, for normative self-government, for 
reflective distance from one’s motives that enables one to ask whether one 
should be so motivated. Hence Adam Smith’s internal spectator forming 
judgments about the propriety of our own feelings and motives. Hence humans’ 
capacity to be motivated by what Darwin called ‘that short but imperious word 
“ought”.’29 Indeed, in response to Korsgaard, de Waal concedes that other 
animals operate at the concrete behavioural level while humans ‘follow an 
internal compass, judging ourselves (and others) by evaluating the intentions 
and beliefs that underlie our own (and their) actions’ and, in short, that ‘this 
level of morality, with its desire for consistency and “disinterestedness,” and its 
careful weighing of what one did against what one could or should have done, 
[is] uniquely human.’30 
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But notice that the question here—whether anthropomorphism about 
nonhuman animals is a category mistake—is inherently controversial, and in 
several ways. What is at issue is, in part, a range of questions over which 
philosophers have disagreed and continue to do so—Hume and Kant, 
sentimentalists and rationalists. Central among such questions is how to 
conceive of morality and where its boundaries lie. Thus Korsgaard writes that 
‘the ability to form and act on judgments of what we ought to do’ constitutes 
‘the essence of morality’,31 whereas de Waal (who writes of morality as a tower 
with several levels) sees this only as the highest level of morality more broadly 
conceived. And, further, it is unclear what in this discussion is a priori and what 
empirical. De Waal, as we have seen, writes of ‘anthropodenial’ as ‘the a priori 
rejection of shared characteristics between humans and animals’ and Korsgaard, 
as a Kantian, seems to be making an a priori claim about the essence of 
morality, while also making empirical claims about animals as wantons and 
asserting that ‘how far in the animal kingdom [the capacity for autonomy 
extends] is certainly an empirical one.’32 (If nonhuman animals were discovered 
to exhibit signs of such a capacity would they then count as candidate humans?) 
Recognizing certain categorial boundaries may make little or no direct 
practical difference to our lives. Correcting Ryle’s visitors’ category mistakes 
will enable them to make some sense of visiting Oxford and watching a cricket 
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match, but that is all. However, this discussion of anthropomorphism does have 
the potential to make some practical difference to how we understand and treat 
animals.  
Korsgaard does not take her Kantian view of morality to endorse the 
vested interests explanation for distinguishing humans from other animals. 
Indeed, she takes her view roundly to condemn mistreating them in the way we 
so often do. She cites a story (taken from de Waal) of a capuchin hurling a 
squirrel monkey at a human observer and comments that ‘no species is more 
guilty of treating those who belong to other kinds as ambulant objects than we 
are, and we are the only species that knows it is wrong,’ so that we are ‘under a 
strong obligation to treat the other animals decently, even at cost to ourselves.’33 
The idea that a category mistake is made when describing animals as capable of 
morality is thus used to extend the moral obligations humans have toward 
animals. 
Alternately, when de Waal recommends the virtues of a carefully refined 
anthropomorphism, his intention is to open up new ways of looking at the 
world, ways that could complement and improve ongoing research in the field 
of experimental biology and ethology. It is one perspective, one that certainly 
exists in tension with other perspectives, but a tension that has the potential to 
be virtuous and productive. His intention is not, for example, to appeal for a 
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kind of gratuitous anthropomorphism that would allow for all animal behaviour 
to be understood as having an analogue with all human behaviour: Gorillas 
developing concern for climate change for instance, chimpanzees having 
religions, or dolphins smiling with delight when swimming with hotel guests. 
And, we may add, ants and bees, for example, are rightly described as ‘social’ 
but they are so in very specific ways that need to be closely specified. The idea 
of the category mistake is thus preserved, but moved further back. Some animal 
behaviour is continuous with human and should be integrated into our 
understanding of their respective behaviours, but other behaviours are not and 
so warrant continued exclusion.   
Hayek and Polanyi: The Dangers of making mistakes 
This foray into the debate over the rightness or otherwise of describing animals 
in vocabulary ordinarily preserved for humans, demonstrates the fluidity that 
can accompany our definitions and understandings of certain phenomena. What 
we take to be the fixed, bottom-line and common sense perception of the world 
around is open to dispute and contestation.  
Hayek’s designation of the correct boundary for designating category 
mistakes is especially radical in that it seeks precisely to deny the possibility for 
any such fluidity: From the ground up, the whole discourse on social justice is 
discarded. It is not as if some social justice can be incorporated into an overall 
picture of the world: His is not a negotiation with, but rather a wholesale 
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rejection of, any discourse, research strategy or social/political/economic 
intervention that would look to make use of the ideas of social justice. 
Opponents who use such terms have simply got it wrong: The possibility for 
meaningful discussion going forward demands that such usage be dropped 
because the reality that exists, according to Hayek, at the bottom of all complex 
social processes, renders the whole vocabulary of social justice unintelligible. In 
order to challenge this level of occlusion, in order to be able to speak of social 
justice, requires that a fundamental challenge be mounted against that 
descriptive starting point. This is not about moving the boundary of a category 
mistake forwards or backwards, as in our discussion of anthropomorphism 
above, but challenging, in its entirety, a particular view of reality and all that is 
consequent to that view. It is thus to confront the accusation of having made a 
category mistake with an accusation of one’s own. 
One challenge to Hayek’s description comes from Karl Polanyi. In what 
follows, we are not committed to Polanyi’s alternative as the better one. Rather, 
our argument is only that these issues, like anthropomorphizing animals, are 
inherently controversial in a way Ryle’s category mistakes and the notion that 
talk of moral stones is nonsense, are not. It is the inescapable controversy 
surrounding the descriptions and prescriptions surrounding our understanding of 
concepts, practices and what to do about them, that is our concern. Furthermore, 
it is also through the various approaches that are adopted in handling and 
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indeed using this kind of controversy that occlusion becomes such a powerful 
political tool.   
Polanyi, like Hayek, is exercised by the importance of identifying and 
avoiding category mistakes when describing the realities of social and economic 
life. Both Polanyi and Hayek can be said to agree that a functioning economy 
requires the meeting of certain background conditions, not least a framework of 
law, but also social and cultural preconditions that guarantee trust and mutual 
predictability between market participants.34 Where they differ, however, is in 
terms of how the market fits into their overall description of society. For Hayek, 
the market performs a self-regulating function, such that once those minimal 
background conditions are established, it cannot abide any form of interference. 
It is this occlusion of possibilities for the imposition of will on the processes of 
the market that, for Hayek, renders social justice just so much nonsense.  
For Polanyi, the market so construed is a fiction dependent on its own set 
of category mistakes. Polanyi’s idea of an ‘always-embedded market economy’ 
directly confronts those who regard the market as an institution capable of 
autonomy from their social and cultural context and from processes of political 
decision-making.35 Indeed, Polanyi emphasizes the entwined logic of 
interactions between market and state, rather than subordinating either one to 
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the other: there is no autonomous market in which the state operates merely as 
an enforcer of contract or a disorganiser of pernicious collective interests. 
Market society depends upon continuous extra-economic influences, including 
political coercion, which cannot be confined merely to the moment of the 
market’s formation.36    
The fiction of the autonomous, self-regulating market is, for Polanyi, in 
turn grounded on the further category mistakes that land, labour and money can 
be treated as commodities, i.e. as objects produced for sale on a market. The 
theory of market self-regulation assumes that these ‘fictitious commodities’ can, 
like all other actual commodities, be brought into equilibrium with each other 
and with commodities-proper, by an effectively autonomous price mechanism 
(Ibid.:71-80). It is as a consequence of making and compounding these category 
mistakes that the intense dangers represented by market society have their seed. 
Since our aim here is not to adjudicate between the rightness of Polanyi vs. 
Hayek (or anyone else for that matter) there is no need here to go into the 
historical patterns and trajectories Polanyi uses to make his point. It will suffice 
to note that his argument is structured around the way various classes organised 
to protect these three fictitious ‘substances’ against the commodification that 
was being imposed by competing classes. From this alternative perspective, 
Hayek is thus guilty of making two category mistakes. First, he treats non-
                                                          
36 Polanyi, The Great Transformation. 147 
 22 
commodities as if they were or could ever be commodities. Second, the market 
is treated as a space that can be rendered distinct from social life and political 
policies and decisions and thus the coercive encroachments of state power.  
 
Occlusion, Power and Controversy  
Category mistakes come at different levels of occlusiveness depending on 
precisely what, and how much, they pre-empt. Three distinct levels are 
suggested by our discussion so far. First, there are the unquestionable ones that 
are just mistakes, like ‘moral stones’ or those resulting from misunderstanding 
how to describe the arrangements of a university or a game of cricket. Secondly, 
there are mistakes which some see as obvious but others do not, mistakes where 
the criteria are inevitably more controversial and the ability to say something 
determinate about what is to count as a category mistake is altogether more 
contestable, but where no direct practical implications follow. The contending 
sides are engaged in a dispute of practical significance, there is room for debate 
and the issues in dispute are plainly visible to the disputants. Thus, whether or 
not one views animals anthropomorphically does not dictate (though it will 
certainly influence) how one treats them: humans can, it seems, rationally 
disagree over whether the Categorical Imperative requires them to be 
vegetarians, or perhaps vegans. Nevertheless, to describe something as a 
category mistake is to say something determinate and definitive, even pre-
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emptive: the point is to prevent subsequent misapplication of a concept or 
description to the category in question. It is, despite the contestability of 
whatever position one adopts, to argue strongly against the imposition of 
particular understandings onto particular phenomena. To describe something as 
nonsensical or wrongheaded is to be unequivocal.  
What distinguishes the third way of attributing category mistakes is that it 
is directly both thought- and action-guiding: to accept that one is mistaken has 
determinate personal, social and sometimes political consequences: it aims to 
foreclose discussion and to influence behaviour decisively in a particular 
direction. The stakes are not merely cognitive: to be convinced by Hayek or by 
Polanyi is to take a political stand. If we are convinced that Polanyi is correct 
that labour really cannot be commodified and that market society depends on 
the attempt to impose that status on labour, then we are committed to supporting 
resistance to such attempts. And if we believe with Hayek that policies aiming 
to impose ‘social justice’ on complex social processes amount to a ‘fatal 
conceit’ and that the ‘road to serfdom’ is paved with social-democratic 
intentions, then we are committed to supporting resistance to such dangers. 
Both thinkers thus foresee and fear large-scale dangers flowing from the 
mistakes they expose—in both their cases, the danger of a menacing totalitarian 
future. Accusing someone of making a category mistake in this third way is the 
clearest case of what we are calling an exercise of the power of occlusion. It 
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consists in conveying a particular, controversial vision of the world by pre-
empting another or others. It will be a successful exercise of such power to the 
extent that it gains epistemic authority—to the extent, that is, that it comes to 
dominate and define the common sense that informs a particular discipline or 
practice. 
One way to describe the battle of ideas that occurs between exponents of 
different descriptions of reality is as a ‘credibility contest’. These contests take 
place between ‘bearers of discrepant truths [who] push their wares wrapped in 
assertions of objectivity, efficacy, precision, reliability, authenticity, 
predictability, sincerity, desirability, tradition’. From these processes emerge 
those who gain legitimate power to define, describe, and explain bounded 
domains of reality’.37 But whatever forms the pushing of those wares might 
take, the force of the ‘better argument’ winning against the background of 
inevitable controversy is something that cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, 
controversy surrounds this very idea of what is to count as the better argument. 
The consequences of such contests are over what gets to be taken seriously, i.e. 
as the epistemic reality we confront when we confront the world in its various 
guises, and what gets dismissed as nonsense, as a failure to grasp reality before 
any confronting can get started.          
                                                          
37 Thomas Gieryn. Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999) 1. 
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There is often something peculiarly charged about these credibility 
contests as they occur within the social sciences, perhaps especially for 
economics, because it is a discipline that is deeply imbricated with the concrete 
practices that fill our political, social and economic worlds. What Hayek and 
Polanyi exploit from the charged quality of such contests is the danger of 
making the category mistakes to which they alert their readers. Such category 
mistakes are thus turned into questions of morality and politics. It is not then 
solely about making one thing appear as preferable, perhaps even as ‘common 
sense’ at some level. It is also intimately tied up with making that which 
challenges this common sense appear altogether threatening and dangerous. 
Fear thus plays a crucial role in the story, the maker of the occlusive move 
taking pains to insist that unless we accept his or her way of seeing, we risk 
inviting certain consequences about which we should be actively afraid.  
This double move is, we emphasize, performed by both Hayek and 
Polanyi. For Hayek the danger lies in the ‘fatal conceit’ of supposing the state – 
or any single agent – is capable of imposing definite end-patterns on a process 
that by its essential nature cannot truck such interference. The road to serfdom 
is paved with social democratic intentions. For Polanyi the fear is that failing to 
recognise that land, labour and money are ‘fictitious commodities’ will 
inevitably liquidate the ‘non-contractualized supports’ necessary for social life, 
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and end in social and cultural catastrophe.38 It is precisely this process that, for 
Polanyi, paved the way for the totalitarian and fascist nightmare in 20th Century 
Europe.39 Both make a pre-emptive move that closes down those grievances, 
motives and ideals which cannot make sense against the mutually exclusive 
assumptions that Hayek and Polanyi take as foundational.   
Credibility: Who gets to describe the world?  
Fear of something can provide phenomenal motivational force. But in the 
heat of these ‘credibility contests’ what helps any particular designation of the 
correct source of fear gain ascendency over another, such that it is then able to 
prompt action? An example of the fear-factor actually failing to drive what 
might turn out to be the necessary steps to avert huge disasters, is disagreement 
over the causes and extent of climate change. Conservation biologists, climate 
change scientists and concerned citizens ‘convinced that declining biodiversity 
imperils human existence’ have thus far been unable – despite predictions of 
catastrophic consequences – to shift policy, consumption patterns and economic 
organisation in a sufficiently radical new direction. To be clear, it is not as if 
these groups have been entirely dismissed as a ‘politicised and misdirected 
Cassandra’.40 Nevertheless, given the matrix within which their interventions 
have been – and have to be – made, a matrix that includes huge vested interests 
                                                          
38 Block & Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism, 110.  
39 Karl Polanyi, “The Essence of Fascism”, In Christianity and the Social Revolution, eds. John Lewis, Karl Polanyi, 
and Donald Kitchen (London. Gollancz, 1935) 359 – 394. 
40 Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science. 13 
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for example (alongside press, foundation officials and average citizens), the 
fear-inspiring rhetoric of such groups has thus far failed to produce the kinds of 
radical changes that can avert planetary disaster.  
So what does the work in rendering the fear summoned up by Hayek’s 
warnings about ‘social justice’ talk active and policy-animating? And what has 
enabled the dangers outlined by Polanyi’s critique of ‘market fundamentalism’ 
to be overlooked and overcome? One part of the answer is institutional. These 
ideas, and ideas generally, do not fall ready-made from heaven. Descriptions of 
the world and the prescriptions that emerge from them develop within 
circumstances more or less favourable to their being understood and 
implemented.  When Milton Friedman declared ‘we are all Keynesians now’ he 
was engaging in a battle with what he – and fellow members of MPS– regarded 
as a set of background misunderstandings of economics, society and political 
power, that gave weight and force to the dangerous category mistake ‘social 
justice’. It was then through mobilizing against this common sense that these 
ideas were able to be inculcated within the international institutional order. 
The MPS was a “collective effort” that “can be described as 
transdisciplinary (developing norms and principled beliefs guiding students in 
different disciplines), interdisciplinary (though mainly involving social 
scientists), and trans-academic (though the endeavors to connect to particular 
audiences and the public at large were in the main organized indirectly through 
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think tanks and publishers)”.41 It was a thought collective that took as basic the 
impulse to have its idea suitably integrated into the practices and institutions of 
the world.   
The MPS was no monolithic cabal. There were certainly disagreements 
within members of the group – for example between the “three distinguishable 
sects or subguilds” identified by Philip Mirowski: “the Austrian-inflected 
Hayekian legal theory, the Chicago School of neoclassical economics, and the 
German Ordo-liberals.42 Countering whatever centrifugal forces might be latent 
to such conflicts thus required handling such disagreement in a mutually 
beneficial way. This diffusion and management of disagreement was also an 
explicit part of the overall strategy. 
No less important was the crisis in the late 1970’s, which precipitated the 
speedy decline of Keynesian approaches to economic questions. In particular, 
the combination of high unemployment and high inflation (stagflation) that, 
under Keynesian models, was supposed to be extremely unlikely, meant that 
other ways of viewing the phenomenon and new explanations needed to be 
found to make sense of the world. The failure of the dominant explanatory 
model to explain this phenomenon, and the crisis more generally, provided the 
space within which new economic thinking and new methods of explanation 
                                                          
41 Philip Mirowksi and Dieter Plehwe (eds). The Road from Mont Pellerin.( Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2009) 5 – 6. 
42 Philip Mirowski. Never Let a Serious Crisis go to Waste (London: Verso, 2013) 42 
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could gain ground. To quote Mark Blyth, ‘the world was seen to be “at variance 
with the instruction sheet, so the instruction sheet had to be rewritten".43 At this 
juncture, the MPS was poised precisely to offer the necessary revisions to that 
instruction sheet. 
However, it is, we maintain, unduly restrictive to see the power of 
occlusion as confined to the domain of intentional action: occlusion is not only 
the outcome of deliberate actions by individuals and groups.44 Whatever 
Hayek’s and the rest of MPS’ acumen as strategists – which should certainly not 
be overlooked in the overall explanatory picture –the pre-emption and warning 
functions performed by occlusion do not depend for their success only on this 
purposeful exercise of power. Indeed, distinct from stories of MPS and other 
cabalistic instantiations of power are the everyday forms of occlusion we might 
not even recognise as such, since they are never rendered explicit or made 
provocative by reference to, for example, the making of category mistakes. 
Instead, such occlusion may occur in the everyday practices and taken-for-
granted assumptions that organize the material of our lives, what we do and how 
we understand what we do. It operates, and is reproduced, in ways that are no-
one’s and no group’s strategy. This is not to say that such instances of occlusion 
do not help to advance the claims and ambitions of certain groups, only that the 
occluding occurs in the absence of any explicit intentionality. These ways of 
                                                          
43 Mark Blyth. Austerity: A Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 41. 
44 David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 74 – 75. 
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seeing – that are, again, also ways of not seeing –set the bounds of possibility. 
By taking a definitive stance on the appropriate way to describe the phenomena 
in question, we also define what we regard as ‘realistic’, ‘sensible’ and 
‘common-sense’, and what is to be better understood – and for the most part 
rejected – as ‘misguided’, ‘dangerous’, and utopian. For any prescription that 
rests on a fundamentally mistaken description of what is being prescribed for, 
can only ever amount to a serious failure.  
Deeper Occlusion: The example of Unconditional Basic Income 
‘Deep’ occlusion suggests that what does the occluding is somehow further 
away from being revealed. What obstructs our ability to ‘see’ or ‘think’ or 
suggest certain alternatives, is not immediately available to scrutiny. Indeed, we 
might not even be aware of certain of the controversial assumptions that are 
doing the occluding, so ingrained are they in how we view and approach the 
world around us. This is not to say such things are unavailable to scrutiny tout 
court, only that the offering of alternative approaches will require first the 
discovery and then the unpicking of those constitutive assumptions.  In 
particular, such work of revelation might require the recognition that 
controversies exist, or might exist, in areas that are considered, more or less, 
settled.       
For an example of this most subtle form of occlusion in operation, we 
turn now to a policy proposal that is currently emerging – tentatively – from 
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occlusion. This is the policy of an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). A Basic 
Income is a sum of money given to citizens of a community without any 
stipulation of work or demonstration of a willingness to work. The history of the 
proposal is a long one, dating back, in one form or another, as far back as the 
Speenhamland system in the United Kingdom (which is central both to 
Polanyi’s account of ‘the Great Transformation’ and to debates surrounding 
welfare for the past 200 years). It was also explicitly advocated by Condorcet 
and by Thomas Paine in his 1795 pamphlet Agrarian Justice.45 Since then it has 
resurfaced in – various forms – in Green Party Manifestos, the work of thinkers 
as various as Bertrand Russell, Andre Gorz, and Phillipe Van Parijs,46 and in 
small pilot-projects and experiments in places like Canada. It exists, in the form 
of a citizen dividend derived from oil profits, in the US state of Alaska. 
Recently, the proposal has been picking up considerable steam – political 
parties in New Zealand, Finland, Canada and Switzerland are taking the idea 
seriously, while political figures such as Robert Reich and Yanis Varoufakis are 
also weighing in with their support.47  
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Nevertheless, major barriers remain. At one level are the economic 
concerns. These include basic worries over costs and inflation, deleterious 
effects on labour markets, and the precipitation of capital flight. These fears 
derive from particular assumptions about how markets and money can and 
should operate. There are, though, other bases for scepticism about 
unconditional basic income that cannot be so readily explained by reference to 
these economic considerations, important as they are. There are also deep-lying 
thought-and-action-guiding reasons that can help explain the occlusion of UBI– 
from the consciousness of a great many people. To examine these, we need to 
consider that web of concepts that includes work, the market and 
productiveness.  
One of the most common critiques draws on the widely held belief, 
popularised by Milton Friedman, that there is ‘no such thing as a free lunch’.48 
This expresses the idea that there is something altogether remiss in being given 
something – most especially though perhaps not exclusively, money – without 
providing something else in return. In other words, there is the sense, captured 
by the notion of reciprocity, that if one benefits from the burdens assumed by 
others, one should also, to the best of one’s ability, assume burdens and produce 
a benefit for others to likewise enjoy. Part of this reciprocal exchange takes the 
form of doing something contributory, something which other people, other 
                                                          
48 Milton Friedman. There’s no such thing as a free lunch: Essays on Public Policy (Chicago. Open Court 
Publishing, 1975). 
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members of the ‘cooperative venture’ that constitutes society, could value, as 
opposed to non-contributory activity or inactivity, often condemned as 
‘parasitic’ and categorized as ‘free-riding’.49  
Contribution and reciprocity are interdependent values – for something to 
reciprocate for the benefits produced by another any reciprocating effort must 
be directed toward and informed by the desire to contribute in some way to the 
interests of that person, either directly or qua member of the society or 
community in general. But what are the terms by which such value gets 
identified, assessed and even measured? What are the means by which we 
recognise whether or not reciprocity has been enacted?  
The terms of exchange through which reciprocal relations get produced 
and reproduced are, in this way, dependent on the prior understanding of what 
such contribution can amount to: To reciprocate one must contribute in 
particular ways.  Commonly, the receipt of a benefit such as income requires 
and symbolically registers that a person assume the burdens associated with 
working or, at a minimum, demonstrate a willingness to work. Obviously much 
then hangs on what is to count as work. Here again we arrive at an area of 
contestability and controversy. We are not, in other words, dealing with Ryle’s 
category mistakes, mistakes that can be corrected without much effort, but are 
instead in the midst of a far more complex and deeper-lying phenomenon, 
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where inter-connected definitions about work, effort, burden, reciprocity and 
value are, actually or potentially, sites of disagreement, argument and outright 
struggle.                 
Some of the questions surrounding the definition of work include: Should 
work be understood as confined to the labour market, to the kinds of activity 
that can be bought and paid for as wage labour? Is the work of the rentier class 
to be described as work or something else? What about care-work and labour 
associated with housework? Is effort and time spent in attempts to find work, 
including the kind of “skilling up” such pursuit might involve – is this also 
work? In addition, how should work be valued and remunerated: Should it be 
valued according to the burdens associated with it, to what someone is willing 
to pay for it, or for how valuable some kinds of labour are for the community? 
And who, if anyone, should decide the appropriate metric for calculating such 
values? Finally, and as a coda to the above, is it necessary to work in order for a 
person to receive remuneration from his government? Is working something that 
can be legitimately demanded of people who might (reasonably?) have a 
preference not to work? 
One widely prevalent assumption is that work is, in some sense 
essentially and of its very nature, productive.  But productive of what? Of goods 
and services? Or of something less tangible and measurable? This in turn raises 
the question of what is not and/or should not be described as productive? These 
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questions are of course related: what we understand as productive is going to 
influence what gets understood as non-productive, which in turn informs our 
sense of certain behaviours being remiss for not being sufficiently productive. 
Now, of course, there are some obvious examples of non-contributory, 
non-productive activity. A lifetime of loafing within the confines of one’s living 
room is unlikely to satisfy anyone’s definition of contribution. This is the 
archetypal example of non-reciprocity, variants of which might, within the 
popular consciousness, include both the ‘welfare queen’ and the Malibu surfer. 
But beyond these stereotypical examples of non-productive labour are activities 
that cannot be so easily dismissed as non-contributory and thus as failures to 
reciprocate. 
Contribution is easily and it seems naturally conflated with activities that 
can be bought and paid for in a labour market, broadly conceived. The ways in 
which we are to reciprocate for the contributions other people make is by doing 
what they did – getting a job and performing the tasks associated with that job. 
For example, consider the original UN definition of work in 1956.50 When the 
United Nations started collecting data to determine a country’s GDP the kind of 
labour which was to count within the measure was defined in terms of gainful 
employment, further defined as ‘work for pay and profit’. On this definition 
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anybody working for a wage or salary, selling some part of their produce, is to 
be understood as working. The market is thus placed at the very centre of 
definitions of employment / unemployment, determining the value of what is 
counted as work. Where work cannot be organised – and thus measured – 
according to the market is pre-emptively excluded from this type of 
measurement. Over the years, there have been battles over the drawing of 
precisely these boundaries, what is to count as work-proper and what is not, i.e. 
what is seen as work and what is not. Particularly active within this field of 
contention have been feminists of various stripes who argued that such a 
definition excluded, without justification, whole swathes of labour performed 
almost entirely by females.  
As a result there have been, over the years, various expansions to the 
UN’s definition of work, which now includes activities, largely performed by 
women, such as animal husbandry and food processing. However, tellingly, the 
way in which these activities have been included has been to extend and 
complicate what we mean by the market organisation of work. Goods and 
services are now to be valued according to whether they could have been 
purchased in the market. So, if someone could have been paid to do that work, 
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then it gets included in a definition of productive labour:51 Potential market 
valuation thus becomes work’s defining feature.    
Despite all these expansions then, what remains central throughout is the 
role of the market in determining the value of all relevant labour – if someone is 
paid or receives an income for what they do, then this automatically seems to 
confer contributory status on that activity. The relationship is also one of 
positive correlation – the more money paid for it, the more significant the 
contribution. Those expansions in definition – which should certainly not be 
downplayed –did not, however, effectively challenge the more fundamental 
assumption that organised the valuation of work through the institution of the 
market. 
Against this backdrop of the central core of definitions of work as 
productive, consider what comes to be understood as free-riding. The inverse of 
paid employment is the not-working for pay or profit; free-riding thus gets 
framed by the absences of payment: The paradigm of free-riding becomes the 
worker unwilling to find work. But this loads some dice that need to be more 
carefully inspected. Consider, in contrast, the activities of the landlord. 
Someone who actually does not, we might argue –we need only assert so much 
– do much in the way of actual labour. His access to payment is through the 
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ownership of land or property, not its cultivation, nor its being turned to 
productive use. This is the work of the renters rather than the rentiers. It is 
therefore at least an area of controversy whether this should count as a 
productive form of activity – one wonders if it is even really accurate to 
describe it as activity.  This narrow way of conceiving of reciprocity, and its 
converse free-riding, is thus occlusive in two ways:  
The way we regard productive activity through the paradigm provided by 
the market contributes both to the occlusion of certain kinds of productiveness, 
the work of women in particular as exampled above, and certain putative kinds 
of free-riding or parasitism. First, there is the occlusion of the contributions to 
reciprocity made by those engaged in contributory but non-marketable work; 
Indeed, while domestic labour and care-work might be incorporated at the 
technical level of GDP measurement, the continuing treatment of contribution 
as derivable from the paradigm of what a market can organise and pay for 
means that actual payment for such work has yet to be implemented. The 
potential market value of such productive labour is all it has ever been allowed 
to amount to.  
Second there are the non-reciprocating ‘efforts’ of much market-based 
employment, the rentiers for instance, who essentially accrue income (of 
sometimes staggering quantities) without doing anything other than owning a 
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piece of property.52 Therefore, on the one hand certain forms of recognizably 
productive behaviours are still not being paid for and, on the other, various 
forms of activity are unquestioningly treated as productive.    
The paradigm of (actually or counterfactually) paid employment is thus 
used as a heuristic device to understand all forms of productive labour. It is the 
market, and the monetizable value of labour that gives it its value. Money 
becomes a unit of measurement that in turn becomes a way of seeing activity in 
one way, rather than another. The unit might be presented as a merely 
convenient way of aggregating and valuing across differently situated activities, 
but the question remains whether money should be the criterion by which that 
which is useful and valuable is decided. What other ways of determining value 
get lost this way, are these to be regretted, and what is to be done with that 
regret?   
One of the arguments for a Basic Income is precisely that it provides one 
possible way of both supporting and valuing forms of contribution that currently 
go unremunerated. While it does not do this on an hourly/weekly basis, or 
according to some contractual stipulation of the obligations associated with such 
work, it nevertheless provides money for activities understood as work that are 
a necessary condition for the economy to reproduce itself as a whole.  
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How much other productive – or, more broadly, useful – labour is being 
excluded by our viewing it through the paradigm of paid-employment and the 
market? Approaching work according to what the market can organise and pay 
for we inevitably end up diminishing our understanding of what can and cannot 
count as valuable activity that can contribute to reciprocity. Basic Income offers 
a way for us to avoid pre-emptively assuming our ability to provide accurate 
and/or definitive answers to the question of what is and is not productive. It 
takes a stand only on the fact that the market is unable effectively to measure all 
of the relevantly valuable labour. By then providing adequate resources for 
individuals to not take part in various relationships or economic practices it 
assumes that where such activity is engaged with, it is done so more or less 
voluntarily. In addition, the provision of income sufficient enough to both 
support the individual and allow negotiation of the conditions and terms of that 
activity means that the work is both valued and, since workers can leave work 
they consider to be undignified or insufficiently remunerated, brought up to a 
minimal level of decency.       
Undoubtedly this fails to address the issue of those who will not work 
with provision of a basic income. There are those who take a free lunch and 
have no intention of contributing or of repayment. Precisely how big a problem 
this is – at both the technical and moral levels – is a matter of debate: For 
instance, if certain free-riding is a marginal problem, as it arguably is today 
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(less than 3% of the Department of Work and Pension’s budget goes toward UK 
unemployment benefit in the UK, only a fraction of which is claimed 
fraudulently).53 then perhaps Basic Income is an all things considered good 
thing, despite such costs. Our intention has not been to weigh in on these issues 
directly, and certainly not to challenge the fundamental importance of 
reciprocity and ‘doing one’s bit’ more generally. Our aim has been instead to 
complicate the debate around which descriptions of contribution and non-
contribution get made, to provide a framework within which free-riding is 
opened up as its own area of controversy.    
The introduction of a basic income could radically transform currently 
flailing – or even non-existent – welfare systems. What we hoped to have 
shown with this brief foray into basic income is the idea that regarding it as 
utopian, as misguided or as basically wrongheaded is to take a definitive stance 
on a range of topics that are inherently controversial and up-for-grabs. To 
dismiss it as an idea is thus, whether implicitly or otherwise, to take a side on 
these debates. For example, it is to assume a certain view of human beings as 
economic actors, to assume the market and only the market can properly assess 
productivity and valuable activity, to buy into the inflationary consequences of 
basic income. Our attempt has been to, question, albeit briefly, some of the 
                                                          
53 Public perception of this figure often misses the truth by a country mile: 29% of the British population 
believes that more money is spent on Job Seeker’s Allowance than pensions, when in fact pensions amount to 
15 times more expenditure. See Ipsos MORI. Perils of Perceptin. 2013. Topline Results Available at: 
https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/ipsos-mori-rss-kings-perils-of-perception-topline.pdf  
 42 
assumptions that fill out those sides of the debate, and to perhaps encourage 
further reflection on them. 
The potential re-emergence from occlusion of basic income in recent 
debates suggests that the time is becoming ripe to challenge these assumptions 
and these stances. The increasing automation of work, the expansion of 
exploitative working conditions and the continued precarity of work, and huge 
increases in inequality are just some of the conditions that are leading thinkers, 
politicians and activists alike to a broad-based advocacy of basic income.54 
Increasing the potential of the challenges proffered by UBI will thus require an 
exposure of precisely what is being occluded, the assumptions that ground that 
occlusion, and what can be done to challenge them. 
Conclusions 
Every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing. We call this inescapable fact 
occlusion, where the perspective that is assumed is pre-emptive, that is, working 
to render alternative ways of seeing less accessible because less credible or 
incredible. The power of occlusion is the capacity to pre-empt both that which 
gets seen and the terms of discussion through which what gets seen is described. 
This capacity may be exercised more or less successfully. In political life this 
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typically works by shaping people’s common-sense understandings and thus 
their dispositions to act and it can do so by inducing fear of dangers.  
 The power of occlusion may be intentional and deliberate, even 
manipulative, but to understand it in this way is to be unnecessarily restrictive. 
At its deepest and most effective the perspective that gets adopted can be the 
consequence of a more or less unacknowledged web of interconnected and 
inter-defined concepts and beliefs. This is deep occlusion, since resistance to 
prevailing views with the aim of rendering alternative ways of seeing possible 
requires considerable excavation to make clear exactly what is being assumed 
and why. We have sought briefly to exemplify such deep occlusion by citing the 
case of unconditional basic income and its relationship to collective 
understandings of, amongst other things, work. 
 The power of occlusion works by establishing what is seen as ‘feasible’: 
by setting the boundaries that divide what is generally viewed as ‘realistic’ from 
what is taken to be ‘utopian.’ To be realistic regarding the world as it stands is 
take a particular stand regarding the various occlusions at play at one time. 
Interrogation of and resistance to those occlusions requires an alternative 
framework by which to view that reality. These alternative frameworks are not 
always plausibly described as ‘realistic’.  Our suggestion is that this is the work 
of categorizing and classifying, which itself involves ‘boundary work’: 
defending and policing the categories and metaphors that we live by and that 
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inform our reasoning against actual and potential challenges. We have sought to 
show some of the complex ways in which the processes of occlusion make 
controversial claims to epistemic authority and how this can enlist the 
motivational force of fear in the face of dangers foreseen.   
In the domain of politics this work is always inextricably both agonistic 
and argumentative: both establishing and maintaining credibility on the one 
hand, and justifying belief on the other. It thus involves both power and 
reasoning. What counts as the better argument in political life is a matter open 
to significant contestation (quite apart from the relevance of mendacity in 
politics which, sadly, all too often has a decisive role in how arguments play 
out). Beyond the arguments that are had in political life are a whole host of 
arguments that are not being had. Occluding an argument, one might say, is a 
smashingly effective way of winning it.   
